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State Courts and the Federal System
Griffin B. Bell*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more important aspects of federalism lies in the relation-
ship which has been established between state and federal courts.
The interworkings of the judicial process involve power in some in-
stances and principles of comity in others. The purpose of this article
is to examine this relationship, including possible areas of abrasion
resulting from the interworkings between the two court systems.
At the time of the founding of the Republic, the only courts were
those maintained by the states. However, the Constitution super-
imposed the Supreme Court over the state courts in matters arising
under the Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United States.-
The added federal rights under the Constitution resulted in dual
citizenship-state and federal.2 While state rights are normally vindi-
cated in the state courts, federal rights enjoy concurrent status and
may be vindicated in the state courts as well as in a federal forum.
This posture of citizenship is a part of our system of federalism which
may be characterized as having more than one center of power and
responsibility.3 Even though there are usually three such centers
(federal, state, and local), in the court system we are concerned
generally with only the federal and state levels.
The state courts are largely responsible for the administration of
the laws in this country.4 The supremacy clause of the Federal Consti-
tution dictates that state courts must accord federal rights to their
litigants. 5 However, this requirement would be implicit in the Consti-
* United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit.
1. U.S. CONST., art. III; THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 555-56. (Cooke ed. 1961)
(Hamilton); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 303 (1816).
2. The resulting dual citizenship was not too different from that found in Rome
and the provinces. A familiar biblical example is St. Paul, who had extra rights of
citizenship because he was Roman born. His successful challenge of the centurion was
on this basis. Acts 22:24-29.
3. See Bell, Federalism in Current Perspective, 1 GA. L. REv. 586 (1967).
4. In fiscal year 1968, a total of 102,163 civil and criminal cases were commenced
in the federal district courts: 71,449 civil and 30,714 criminal. Non-federal prisioner
petitions totaled 8,301 during this period. 1968 ANN. REP. ADmVnsTRAV OFFICE OF
UNITED STATES CounTs, 113, 124. This total is to be compared with state court fllings
in 1967 in Fulton County (Atlanta), Georgia alone: 72,933 civil cases and 12,471
criminal cases in state courts of record. (Includes small claims court and misde-
meanors).
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
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tution even in the absence of the supremacy clause. Alexander Hamil-
ton made this clear in The Federalist No. 33 when, speaking of the
controversy over the supremacy clause and the necessary and proper
clause, he stated:
These two clauses have been the sources of much virulent invective and
petulant declamation against the proposed constitution, they have been
held up to the people, in all the exaggerated colours of misrepresentation,
as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be
destroyed and their liberties exterminated .. . and yet strange as it may ap-
pear, after all this clamour, to those who may not have happened to con-
template them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence,
that the constitutional operation of the intended government would be pre-
cisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were
repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth, which would
have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act
of constituting a Federal Government, and vesting it with certain specified
powers....f
The authorities demonstrate that there was little or no debate at
the constitutional convention concerning the supremacy clause.7 In-
deed, it may seem ironic in present day context that the clause was
proposed by the backers of the New Jersey Plan, the persons most
opposed to a strong central government. One of the features of the
Virginia Plan, whose proponents favored a strong central govern-
ment, was the Council of Revision, which would have been able to
negate any state law which it deemed contrary to the Constitution.
The backers of the New Jersey Plan, who considered this too great
an intrusion on the prerogatives of the states, were able to defeat
the proposals for such a Council. At that point, in the words of
Professor Rossiter, the proponents of the New Jersey Plan "presented
the Supremacy Clause as a consolation prize to Madison," thus prov-
ing "that they wished the common government well."a Thus the
supremacy clause was accepted by all with little question, being will-
ingly offered by the supporters of a weak central government and
willingly accepted by the supporters of a strong national government.
However, during the struggle for ratification, the supremacy clause
became a point of great contention, and men such as Robert White-
hill of Pennsylvania said that it "eradicates every vestige of state
government-and was intended so-it was deliberate."9 It was to this
type of opposition that Hamilton directed The Federalist No. 33.
6. TbE FEDERAtisT No. 33, supra note 1, at 204.
7. See M. FAERAND, Tm FRAmN OF THE CoNsrtrnON OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913); C. RossrrEa, 1787-THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966).
8. Rossiter, supra note 7, at 176, 197, respectively.
9. Id. at 284.
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The focus of The Federalist No. 82 is directly on the relationship
between the national government and the state courts. Hamilton
understood that only experience would bring a concord:
The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may
distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and
nicety; and these may in a particular manner be expected to flow from
the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial in-
corporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. 'Tis time only that can
mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of
all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and con-
sistent WHOLE.10
An examination of that experience, as it relates to state and federal
courts, points up the ascendency of the lower federal courts vis-a-vis
state courts in the area of federal rights. This ascendency is apparent
in three particular areas: federal habeas corpus for state prisoners;
the removal of cases from state to federal courts; and the use of the
injunctive process by federal courts in state criminal proceedings."'
II. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
The federal district courts,'2 which administer the federal criminal
statutes in the context of federal statutes and the Constitution, are
subject to the supervisory power of the Supreme Court and the fed-
eral courts of appeal.13 This supervisory power has not, however,
been applied to the state courts, whose attributes of sovereignty are
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 1, at 553. On the question of concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts over cases arising "under the laws of the union," Hamilton
suggested the possibility of direct appeals from state courts to inferior federal courts.
Id. at 555-57.
11. Since this article is addressed to the role of state courts in the federal system, as
distinguished from federal limitations on state legislative power, the question of federal
preemption does not fall within its scope. Although not discussed here, one phase of
preemption does, however, bear directly on the power of the state courts-the state
injunctive remedy in labor disputes. See Comment, The Changing Face of Federal
Pre-emption in Labor Relations, 36 FoRnDsAm L. REv. 731-45 (1968). Another matter
that will not be discussed is the certification to state courts of questions of state law
arising in federal cases. See Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
See generally Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of
Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964).
12. The importance of the history of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners is
indicated by the rise in state habeas corpus petitions in federal courts since the decision
of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). These petitions increased from 1,292 in 1962
to 7,364 in 1967. In fiscal year 1968, habeas corpus and other civil appeals by non-
federal prisoners totaled 1,248, which constituted 16.7% of the 7,396 appeals from the
federal district courts.
13. La Buy v. Howes Leather Company, 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Communist Party of
the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d
941 (5th Cir. 1966).
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such that the only federal limitations on them arise from the Consti-
tution, treaties, or laws of the United States. The supremacy clause,
standing alone, might not disturb this sovereignty except in the area
of direct appeal to the Supreme Court,14 and it probably would not
suffice to give federal courts at any level habeas corpus jurisdiction or
authority otherwise to consider collaterally the federal claims of state
prisoners theretofore tried in state courts. Therefore, it remained for
Congress to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts over such matters.
This development of federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction came
in three stages, the first two by way of statute. In the Judiciary Act
of 178915 Congress invested the federal courts with habeas corpus
jurisdiction over federal prisoners. The sovereignty of the state courts
over state prisoners was not disturbed until 1867 and the occurrence
of events following the Civil War. The Congress then gave the fed-
eral courts broad habeas corpus jurisdiction in state prisoner cases.1
The Supreme Court had almost immediately exercised its habeas
corpus jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789 in the cases of
federal prisoners.1? Prior to the 1867 Act the Court recognized that no
federal court was empowered to issue the writ in the case of a state
prisoner. 8 However, despite the Act, it was not until 1886 that a
federal habeas corpus case involving a state prisoner reached the
Supreme Court.19 In Ex parte Royale;0 the prisoner was under a
state indictment, but had not been tried. The Supreme Court af-
14. The Constitution contemplated that trials in state courts would be subject both
to the Federal Constitution and to appeals to the Supreme Court. See Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 303 (1816); THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note
1, at 555-56.
15. 1 Stat. 82 (1789).
16. 14 Stat. 385 (1867). For a short history of the federal habeas corpus statutes,
see In re Brosnaham, 18 F. 62, 70-71, 81 (C.C. W.D. Mo. 1883), where Justice
Miller discusses the judiciary Act of 1789, the Act of 1833 (known as the Force Bill),
the Act of 1842, and the Act of 1867. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9
(1963); Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D.
407 (1953). Today, the power to grant the writ exists in ". . . the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions . . ." when the prisoner is "... in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States .... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a)(c)(3). Query
whether the power to grant the writ as to federal prisoners is not implicit in U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 9, which provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended?
17. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (illegal detention-prisoners
discharged); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806) (illegal detention-
prisoners discharged); United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795) (federal
prisoner admitted to bail).
18. Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
19. From 1868 to 1885 the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review habeas
corpus decisions of the circuit courts under the 1867 Act. See 15 Stat. 44 (1868); 23
Stat. 437 (1885); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); but of. Ex
parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
20. 117 U.S. 24 (1886).
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filmed the denial of the writ on the ground that the state had not
been given the opportunity to decide the federal questions which
might arise. The power of the federal courts to grant the writ was
emphasized, but the emphasis was in terms of discretion:
That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing,
under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the
Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good
requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict be-
tween courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
Constitution.21
This case gave rise to the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine-still
the most severe qualification on federal habeas corpus in state prisoner
cases.
22
The third stage, a broader federal remedy for state prisoners, was
slow in coming to fruition, notwithstanding the 1867 Act, and was
generally unavailable to state prisoners for the next half century.2
One author, alluding to the fact that the grant of the remedy to state
prisoners was usually limited to those instances where the state court
lacked jurisdiction, stated:
We can summarize the law as of 1915 this way: If a [statej court of
competent jurisdiction adjudicated a federal question in a criminal case,
its decision of that question was final, subject only to appeal, and not
subject to redetermination on habeas corpus. There existed a few classes
of issues (principally the constitutionality of the statute creating the of-
fense) which were labeled jurisdictional though they did not really bear
on the competence of the committing court; these were, however, strictly
limited .... 24
The development of a broader federal remedy for state prisoners,
really the implementation of the 1867 Act, was left for a series of
Supreme Court decisions in this century. A slight break came in the
case of Frank v. Mangum,5 when the Court affirmed the district
court's refusal to grant the writ which was applied for on the ground
that the state trial was "mob dominated."2 The Court did suggest
that in those cases where a state tribunal had failed to supply cor-
rective processes for the full and fair litigation of federal questions
21. Id. at 252.
22. See SOKOL, A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL IAB s CoRPus 110-26 (1965); Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. RIv.
1315, 1325-27 (1961). -
23. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 410 & n.17, 411 & nn. 19 & 20 (1963).
24. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARv. L. REv. 483-84 (1963).
25. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
26. As an historical footnote, Leo Frank, the applicant, was later taken from a
Georgia prison and hanged by a mob. Busr, GCurLrT oR NOT Gurmvy 72-73 (1952).
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(whether or not jurisdictional) in a state criminal proceeding, the
federal court, on a habeas hearing, might inquire into the merits in
order to determine whether the detention was unlawful. 27 However,
the Court was of the opinion that the state had afforded a sufficient
corrective process through its procedures for motions for new trial
and appeal. Consequently, the Court did not review the facts itself.
Frank was the first recognition that a federal habeas court was
authorized to look behind the bare record of a trial proceeding and
conduct a factual hearing to determine the merits of alleged depri-
vations of constitutional rights.2 Justice Holmes, joined by Justice
Hughes, dissented on the ground that the federal court should have
made an independent factual determination on the issue of mob-
domination, and since there was an actual subversion of justice, the
right involved fell under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This categorization of the cause of action again involved
lack of jurisdiction in the state trial court, but it was jurisdiction lost
by the absence of due process of law. This fourteenth amendment
assertion by the dissent, together with the majority's suggested in-
dependent federal habeas hearing procedure, signalled the beginning
of a broad federal habeas remedy for state prisoners.
Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Frank became his majority opinion
in Moore v. Dempsey,29 where the Court reversed a district court's
dismissal without hearing of a petition for habeas corpus. As in Frank,
the applicants claimed that their state trial was mob-dominated. The
Court held that the Arkansas corrective process, even if perfected
and given allegations that the trial was void, would not suffice to
"... allow a judge of the United States to escape the duty of examin-
ing the facts for himself."30 Mooney v. Holohan31 expanded the due
process clause basis for the writ from mob-domination to include state
prosecution use of known perjured testimony. Although leave to
file a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court was denied on the failure to exhaust state remedies, the due
process basis received the imprimatur of the Court. A very real
breakthrough for state prisoners came in Brown v. Allen,32 when the
Court fully considered three state prisoners' petitions for the writ by
reaching and rejecting the federal claims presented on the merits.
There was no backing or filling. The claims alleged in the three cases
were: systematic exclusion of Negroes from the juries, coerced con-
27. Cf. Bator, supra note 24, at 486-87.
28. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 60 (1968).
29. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
30. Id. at 92.
31. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
32. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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fessions, and a procedural defect which prevented a state court ap-
peal from being decided on the merits. These claims had all been
previously adjudicated by the state courts. The Court affirmed the
action of the lower court in denying the writs, but the power of fed-
eral courts to redetermine the merits of federal constitutional ques-
tions theretofore decided in state criminal proceedings was firmly es-
tablished,m and was evidenced subsequently by a gradual increase in
petitions by state prisoners.1
The several opinions in Brown v. Allen resulted in a somewhat
unclear decision, and it remained for the Court in Fay v. Noia35 to
bring reasoning and order to the subject. Prior to this decision two
schools of thought had been developing: one school viewed as un-
settling the idea of review by federal district courts of opinions of
the highest courts of the states on federal questions, while on the other
hand, there was a considerable body of opinion to the effect that
federal questions should be determined in federal courts as a matter
of course. The Court in Fay v. Noia and Townsend v. Sain,36 decided
the same day, took a middle ground. The federal courts were given
the last word on federal questions, but much latitude was left to the
state courts to administer state prisoner federal questions. The result
was a form of pragmatism in the combination of quasi-abstention
and a delegated hearing process from federal to state courts.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of five in Fay v. Noia,
analogized the federal writ of habeas corpus, as available to state
prisoners, with the common law writ and especially Bushell's case.
37
He then concluded that habeas corpus reached any restraint stemming
from criminal proceedings so fundamentally defective as to make
imprisonment pursuant to them constitutionally intolerable.38  The
33. See Schaefer, Federalism and Criminal Procedure, 70 H.Ajv. L. REv. 1, 20-21
(1956), to the effect that the Act of 1867 vested the federal courts with plenary power
to vindicate all fourteenth amendment rights of state prisoners despite the Supreme
Court's occasional use of the language of jurisdiction.
34. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 446 n.1 (1963) (Justice Clark dissenting) shows
the increase in the number of habeas corpus applications filed in district courts by
state prisoners in the following figures, taken from REPORTS OF THE ADmiNSTRATiVE
OFFICE OF THE UNIrED STATES CoURTs: 1941-127, 1945-536, 1950-560, 1955-660,
1960-872, 1961-906, 1962-1232.
35. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
36. Id.
37. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
38. Some examples of the federal rights meeting this standard are: general due
process under the fourteenth amendment, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecution); fourth amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination and prosecutorial comment, Tehan v. Shott,
382 U.S. 406 (1966); sixth amendment right to a proper jury trial, Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953); sixth amendment right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainright, 372
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writ was not limited to inquiries into jurisdiction, but also was held
to embrace denials of due process. Justice Brennan surmised that
with respect to state prisoners, Congress intended by the Act of
1867 to extend the habeas corpus power of the federal courts to its
constitutional limit. It was then determined that such limitations as
had been engrafted on the habeas procedure in state prisoner cases
flowed from comity, not limitations of power, and envisioned only
the postponement rather than the relinquishment of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. Jurisdiction could not be ousted by what the
state court might decide. Those decisions which had been based on
the exhaustion-of-state-court-remedies principle were likened to a
doctrine of abstention "whereby full play would be allowed the
states in the administration of their criminal justice without prejudice
to federal rights enwoven in the state proceedings." 39
The Court then proceeded to define the scope of the remedy. The
exhaustion principle was reaffirmed,40 but made applicable, under the
doctrine of Mooney v. Holohan, only if there was a presently available
state remedy as distinguished from a remedy that might have been
available at the time of the state trial. The requirement that certiorari
to the Supreme Court must have been sought was stricken as a part
of the exhaustion principle,4 1 and the independent-and-adequate-state-
ground doctrine as applied to Supreme Court review of state cases
was rejected as a basis for declining to exercise federal habeas power.
The Court reiterated that res judicata was inapplicable in habeas pro-
ceedings. This settled rule is based upon the idea that habeas corpus
is available only in those cases in which the proceeding being tested
is not merely erroneous, but so fundamentally lawless as to be void.
In sum, the Court in Fay v. Noia stated that the manifest federal
policy was that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall
not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal
judicial review, even in the case of state judgments. The principle of
waiver of constitutional rights in the state trial was equated with the
standard of deliberate by-passing of state procedures. Such a bar
was a part of the discretion vested in the federal courts by statute
U.S. 335 (1963); sixth amendment right to appellate counsel, Worts v. Dutton, 395
F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1968); eighth amendment right to bail, Sellers v. Georgia, 374
F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1967); eighth amendment right to be protected from cruel and
unusual punishment, Hill v. Nelson, 1 Ca'm. L. RE,. 2321 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 1967),
Adderly v. Wainwright, 1 Cam. L. REP. 2295 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 1967); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
39. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 419 (1963).
40. The federal statute incorporating the exhaustion principle is 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1964).
41. Overruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). This requirement has been
seriously erroded, if not rejected, in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489-97 (1953).
[ VOL. 21
1968] STATE COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 957
to dispose of the matter as law and justice require and under equitable
principles.4 Moreover, this bar was to be narrowly construed. Mr.
Justice Brennan pointed to the structure of the state and federal court
relationship in federal habeas matters as it was defined in Brown v.
Allen by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
[No] binding weight is to be attached to the State determination. The
congressional requirement is greater. The State court cannot have the last
say when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be
deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right.43
Although Fay v. Noia set the procedural stage for the unusual in-
crease in federal habeas corpus cases involving state prisoners, it was
not the sole cause of the increase. The refurbishment of the four-
teenth amendment, which made more federal constitutional rights
available to state prisoners, set the substantive stage.44 At first blush,
the problem would seem to be that the state courts have been niggardly
in according federal constitutional rights to their citizens. However,
upon further examination, this postulate appears to be the exception
rather than the rule. The small number of successful petitioners in
the federal courts indicates that the state courts are, in the main,
properly administering federal constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Clark's
dissenting opinion in Fay v. Noia notes that in the period from 1946
to 1957, petitioners were successful in only 1.4 per cent of the cases
brought in the federal district courts.
45
The circumstance that the substantial majority of federal habeas
petitions are without merit, perforce, poses a problem for both the
federal and state court systems. Under the superintending sweep of
power granted to the inferior federal courts by the 1867 Habeas Act
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964). "The court shall summarily hear and determine the
facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice requires."
43. 344 U.S. at 508.
44. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (hanging juries); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (counsel on confrontation by witness); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (admissibility of evidence obtained by wiretapping and
electronic surveillance); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confession);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (prejudicial publicity); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965) (self incrimination and prosecutorial comment); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (confrontation of adverse witnesses); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of adverse witnesses); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964) (confession); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (confession);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (stiffened requirements for search and arrest
warrants); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964) (conduct of prosecution);
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) (conduct of prosecution); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (conduct of prosecution); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search and seizure);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (provision of transcript).
45. 372 U.S. at 445 (citing H.R. REPORT No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)).
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and Fay v. Noia, every state prisoner is now entitled to an extra
review by the federal courts of claims asserting fundamental federal
rights. The approach must be to devise an orderly system of pro-
cedure as between the two systems. The problem arises not from
the fact that the federal inferior courts are reviewing state court judg-
ments, but rather from the existence of concurrent jurisdiction over
the federal rights.
Problems which arose from the increase in petitions for writs of
habeas corpus and the need for procedural accommodation were
partially answered by the suggestion that state post-conviction rem-
edies be established or refined in order that the exhaustion-of-state-
remedies doctrine might be invoked by the federal courts in an
effort to afford state courts the first say in their prisoner cases.46
The states, by and large, have established post-conviction remedies
to this end,47 but, as Fay v. Noia makes clear, the federal habeas juris-
diction is not ousted, only postponed. The state prisoner may still
pursue his federal court remedy after exhausting his state court
remedies. Thus, the prisoner has the possibility of two habeas hear-
ings in addition to direct review in the original state proceeding. 48
It is no answer to denigrate the habeas cases or the federal rights
being asserted.49 The facts of rapid population growth and expanding
court dockets do dictate the need for an efficient and better approach
46. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring);
Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post Conviction Re-
view, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964).
47. For a good discussion of state post-conviction remedies, see the concurring
opinion of Justice Clark in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337-41 (1965), and Note,
State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 HAnv. L. REV. 442, 428-33
(1967). Several states have since added provisions for post-conviction review. See
TEx. CODE Cam. PRoc. art. 11.07 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-127 (Supp. 1967).
48. There is credible evidence that the federal remedy is subject to abuse through
repeated applications. One federal prisoner filed 54 separate petitions for the writ
in the District Court for the North District of Georgia during the period Oct. 1964-
Dec. 1967; another 13 in the period August 1965-Nov. 1967; and still another 5 in
the period Sept. 1966-Sept. 1967. Letter from Chief Judge Morgan, N.D. Ga., to
Chief Judge Brown, Fifth Circuit, January 3, 1968. The records of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the period July 1964-March 1968, show
a total of 220 applications for the writ by 82 state and federal prisoners. The number
of petitions filed by these applicants ranged from 2 to as many as 19 by one state
prisoner.
49. In Brown v. Allen, Justice Jackson, concurring in the result, said that the court
had trivialized the writ to the extent that floods of stale, frivolous, and repetitious
petitions would inundate the dockets of the courts and that the occasional meritorious
application would be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He stated: "He who must
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is
not worth the search." 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953). Justice Schaefer took issue with
this statement, saying that the search was not for a needle but for the rights of a
human being. Shaefer, supra note 33. Experience has taught that there is a modicum
of truth in both positions.
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to safeguard federal rights, but with less lost motion.
The procedural accommodation as between the state and federal
systems may be succinctly stated. Fay v. Noia lays out the scope of
the federal habeas remedy. In accordance with the exhaustion-of-
state-remedies doctrine, the state court is given the first opportunity
to assess the federal rights claim. For this purpose, the state courts
have established post-convention remedies. After an adverse state
habeas court judgment, the state prisoner may then proceed in the
federal court.
The Supreme Court issued important guidelines on the habeas
powers of the federal court in Townsend v. Sain. First, the court
pointed to the power in the federal courts to try the facts anew:
The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this
Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is
plenary. Therefore, where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges
facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal court to
which the application is made has the power to receive evidence and try
the facts anew.
5 0
The court delineated those instances when a federal habeas corpus
hearing is mandatory:
The appropriate standard ... is this: Where the facts are in dispute, the
federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas
applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court,
either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding .... 51
We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a
habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of
the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole;
(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the
state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact
hearing.52
The court then distinguished between the federal habeas court
relying on state findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Although the district judge may, where the state court has reliably found
the relevant facts, defer to the state court's findings of fact, he may not
defer to its findings of law. It is the district judge's duty to apply the
applicable federal law to the state court fact findings independently. The
state conclusions of law may not be given binding weight on habeas . . . .53
50. 372 U. S. at 312 (1963).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 313.
53. Id. at 318.
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In Sanders v. United States,54 decided shortly after Fay v. Noia and
Townsend v. Sain, the Supreme Court rounded out its reinterpretation
of the federal habeas corpus law and procedure by dealing with those
situations involving successive applications for the writ. Adverting
to its holding in Salinger v. Loise, 55 the Court said:
We there announced a governing principle; while reaffirming the inapplica-
bility of res judicata to habeas, we said: "each application is to be disposed
of in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a
consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the dis-
charge sought. Among the matters which may be considered, and even
given controlling weight, are ... a prior refusal to discharge on a like ap-
plication." . . . The petitioner's successive applications were properly
denied because he sought to retry a claim previously fully considered and
decided against him. .... 56
The substance and rationale of Sanders gave rise to the statute on
finality of habeas determinations. 7 The teachings of Fay v. Noia
(exhaustion of state remedy) and Towsend v. Sain (when federal
habeas hearing required) have been embraced by statute.58 These
enactments were 1966 amendments to the Federal Habeas Corpus
Act and are addressed to more efficient federal habeas procedures,
as well as to the definitive role of state and federal courts in their
respective functions as parts of a whole system of justice.
III. REMOVAL OF CASES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL
CoURTS FOR TiRiA
Another division of the judicial phase of federalism involves the
removal of cases, before trial, from state courts to federal courts.
This notion had its inception in the Judiciary Act of 1789,59 but was
then restricted to private civil litigation. As a statutory remedy
based on the idea of concurrent jurisdiction, it has been in continuous
use since that time.
The present removal jurisdiction is found in several statutes: (1)
the general removal provision for civil actions;60 (2) the provision
permitting federal officers being sued or prosecuted to remove the
54. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
55. 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
56. 373 U.S. at 9.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66). See also Statute
Note, 45 TEx. L. REv. 592 (1967).
59. 1 Stat. 79 (1789). Removal jurisdiction is not directly provided for in art, III.
For a history of the removal statutes and their constitutional basis, see HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEMf 40, 379-80, 1019-21
(1953).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
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civil action or the criminal prosecution from the state to the federal
courts;61 (3) the provision for removal of foreclosure actions against
the United States;6 and (4) the provision for removal of civil actions
or criminal prosecutions in civil rights cases. 63 The principal friction
in federal-state court relations springs from this latter civil rights
removal provision in section 1443.6
Literally hundreds of state criminal prosecutions were removed
from state to federal courts under this section during the period
1963-65.65 A modus operandi was established by the federal district
courts wherein hearings were held to determine whether the allega-
tions contained in the removal petitions as they related to civil rights
could be sustained. If so, the cases were to be dismissed; if not, the
cases were to be remanded to the state courts for trial.66 New light
was brought to the problem, however, in 1966 in two significant deci-
sions decided by the Supreme Court.
In Georgia v. Rachel,67 the case was removed to the federal court
by a defendant being prosecuted in the Georgia courts for trespass
while allegedly asserting rights under the public accommodations
section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which specifically prohibited
such prosecutions.6 The Supreme Court held that the statutory right
to equal public accommodations and the right not to be prosecuted
for claiming such accommodations were the type of actions envisioned
for removal under section 1443 (1). On the other hand, in City of
Greenwood v. Peacock,69 decided the same day, the Court rejected
removal where the basis for the petition was deprivation of general
constitutional rights. The defendants, charged with obstructing public
streets in a civil rights demonstration, contended that the Mississippi
statute under which they were charged was unconstitutional both on
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1964). The privilege of removal was extended to members
of the Armed Forces under certain circumstances in 1956. 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (1964).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (1964).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964).
64. The section reads: "Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending: (1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of
such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of
the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; (2) For any act
under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for re-
fusing-to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law."
65. Increase from 18 in 1962 to 1,192 in 1965. 1965 ANN. REP. ADMINIsTRATrvE
OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CouRTs 213-17.
66. See, e.g., Cochran v. City of Eufaula, 251 F. Supp. 981 (M.D. Ala. 1966);
McMeans v. Mayor's Court, 247 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
67. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1964).
69. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
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its face and as applied, and that they were being prosecuted as a part
of the state's policy of racial discrimination. In a companion case,
defendants who were being prosecuted for assault and disturbing the
peace contended that the state prosecution was for the sole purpose
of deterring them from the exercise of their right under the first
amendment to protest racial segregation. The Court held that these
cases were not removable under section 1443(1), since that section
was applicable only to those cases involving violation of rights con-
ferred by civil rights legislation.
The Court in Rachel had stated that the right to public accommo-
dations was a specific statutory right of racial equality, but in City
of Greenwood, it was decided that equal civil rights does not include
broad constitutional guaranties, such as first amendment rights. The
Court went on to point out in City of Greenwood that there is no
specific federal law conferring an absolute right on private citizens
to obstruct a public street, to contribute to the delinquency of a
minor, to drive an automobile without a license, or to bite a police-
man-even if the alleged offender is a civil rights advocate. Likewise,
the Court found that, unlike the situation in Rachel, no federal law
confers immunity from state prosecution on such charges. The Court,
noting the overlap with section 1442, held that section 1443(2) is
available only to federal officers and to persons assisting such officers
in their official duties.70 The sum of Rachel and City of Greenwood
is that removal in civil rights cases is restricted to those cases where
the right allegedly violated by the state is a specific statutory right
of racial equality.
These decisions resulted in the remand of a multitude of pending
removal cases. Moreover, the lower federal courts are now engaged
in effectuating Rachel and City of Greenwood in varying and analo-
gous factual situations; several decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit may be cited by way of example.
In Achtenberg v. Mississippi7' removal was permitted where the
defendant, charged with the crime of vagrancy, alleged in their re-
moval petition that they were arrested while seeking to enjoy equal
public accommodations in a city library and in a restaurant. In
Wyche v. Louisiana72 the defendant was charged with burglary for
entering a highway truck stop without authority with the intent to
commit a battery. The court, following Rachel, granted removal on
the basis of the defendanfs allegations that he was seeking public
70. Id. at 820, n.17.
71. Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1968).
72. Wyche v. Louisiana, 394 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1967).
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accommodations in the restaurant. In McClanahan v. Louisiana the
defendant was charged with disturbing the peace and resisting arrest.
The removal petition alleged the denial of the right to an unbiased
judge, prosecutor, and trial atmosphere (there was no claim of in-
volvement in civil rights activity). The court of appeals, finding
City of Greenwood controlling, dismissed the petition.7 4 Whatley v.
City of Vidalia75 extended Rachel to include removal of a state tres-
pass prosecution where defendants sought to encourage voter registra-
tion activity. The court equated the Voter Rights Act of 196576
with the public accommodations statute in that it proscribed intimi-
dation for the purpose of interfering with the right of a person to
vote or to urge or aid others to vote or attempt to vote .7
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,78 the defendant, who was
charged with loitering, was denied removal on the grounds he did
not allege that he was denied a fair hearing in the Alabama courts
on his right under any law providing "equal civil rights," as defined
in City of Greenwood. The court pointed out that those rights which
inhere in every citizen are not rights arising under a law providing
for "equal civil rights" within the meaning of section 1443(1).
IV. FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS IN STATE COURT PROSECUTIONS
From the earliest days of the Republic, Congress has been cognizant
of the use of the federal injunction to stay proceedings in the state
courts. Section 2283, 79 the successor to a 1793 Act which prohibited
such injunctions, provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay pro-
ceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.
73. McClanahan v. Louisiana, 399 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1968).
1968).
74. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction since it did not fall under
§ 1443, the only removal provision contemplating appeals from remand orders. See
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964).
75. 399 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1938).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (1964).
77. Davis v. Alabama, 399 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1968).
78. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 399 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) is the successor to Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5,
1 Stat. 335, which provided that no writ of injunction might be granted on the part
of federal courts to stay proceedings in any state court. This section was later
amended to make an exception for proceedings in bankruptcy. Act of March 3, 1911,
ch. 265, 36 Stat. 162. The provision, as amended, was carried forward as § 720 of
the Revised Statutes (1874), § 265 of the Judicial Code (1911), and as 28 U.S.C.
§ 379 (1940). Section 2283 resulted from the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 155, 62 Stat. 968. The history of the section together with
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The exceptions to the section 2283 proscription are important. The
first exception, allowing federal courts to stay state proceedings, "where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction," is necessary to protect prior fed-
eral jurisdiction and to give the federal courts the power to stay pro-
ceedings in state cases which are removed to the federal courts.8"
The second exception, allowing federal courts to stay a state proceed-
ing "to protect or effectuate its judgments," was intended to restore
the basic power of federal courts to enjoin the relitigation of cases
and controversies theretofore fully adjudicated by such courts.
81
In Ex parte Young82 the Supreme Court held that the lower federal
court had jurisdiction to enjoin state officers who were about to com-
mence proceedings of either a civil or criminal nature to enforce an
unconstitutional state transportation rate enactment. Since the prose-
cution had not commenced in the Young case, the holding is not con-
trary to section 2283, which deals only with stays sought after prose-
cution has commenced. 3 More recently, in Dombroski v. Pfister4
the Court extended the latitude of this judicially created exception
to the prohibitions of section 2283. In that case, involving an in-
junction to restrain prosecution which had not commenced and
which was under the Louisiana Subversive Activities Act, the Supreme
Court reversed a three-judge district court and concluded that the
complaint alleged irreparable injury such as would justify equitable
relief, thus restraining the prosecution. This holding was premised
on the finding that the statute under which the threatened prosecu-
tion was to take place was unconstitutionally vague and that it con-
tained an invalid presumption. The Court cautioned that a federal
injunction interfering with the state's good faith administration of its
criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with the federal framework
of the Constitution and emphasized that an irreparable injury must
be found if the federal injunction is to issue. The facts indicated that
the first amendment rights which were under harassment and depri-
vation would be "chilled" while the state prosecution was proceeding.
the exceptions which had been statutorially or judicially created to it are fully discussed
by the Supreme Court in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 1181 (1941),
and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richmond Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
80. See Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904) (prior federal jurisdiction);
Structural Steel and Forge Co. v. Union Pacific R.R., 269 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1959)
(removed case). See also WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTs, § 47 at 155-57 (1963).
81. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1947); and MooRE, CommENTAnY
OX UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE, f 0.03 (49) (1949). This power had been lost in
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 18 (1941).
82. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
83. This distinction was pointed out by the Court. Id. at 162. See also Dombroski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
84. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Section 2283 was expressly found inapplicable.8 5
The Dombrowski case has received little following. In the recent
case of Cameron v. Johnson,6 the dissenting justices were of
the opinion that the Court had ignored Dombrowski. In Cameron the
defendants had been engaged for some weeks in picketing a voter
registration office located in a courthouse in Mississippi. The Missis-
sippi legislature, in the interim, passed a criminal statute prohibiting
picketing in such a manner as would obstruct the entrance to court-
houses or public buildings. The sheriff, prior to the passage of the
statute, had permitted picketing on certain parts of the courthouse
grounds, but after the statute was passed, the pickets were dispersed.
While attempting to picket the courthouse again, the defendants
were arrested for violating the statute. Seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the statute was unconstitutional on its face because of
vagueness and overbreadth, the defendants pleaded for injunctive re-
lief against the enforcement of the statute in pending or future crimi-
nal prosecutions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
three-judge district court which had denied relief, and remanded the
case for further consideration in the light of Dombrowski. Upon
rehearing, the district court again denied relief. On the subsequent
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed and concluded that the statute
was not unconstitutional on its face and that the record did not
establish the plaintiff's charges of bad faith or selective enforcement
of the statute. The Court pointed out that Dombrowski recognized
the continuing validity of the maxim that a federal district court
should be slow to act where its power is invoked to interfere by
injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state court.87
The Court viewed Dombrowski as "presenting a situation of the
"impropriety of [state officials] invoking the statute in bad faith to
impose continuing harassment in order to discourage appellant's ac-
tivities'..." 88 Although this statement seems to limit the Dombrowski
holding, the district court's action in Cameron -v. Johnson was affirmed
85. Another leading case on the subject of an injunction where the state prosecu-
tion had not commenced is Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), where
the Court upheld a district court's refusal to enjoin the application of a city ordinance
to religious solicitation through threatened criminal prosecution, -even though the
same ordinance was the same day held unconstitutional in another case. See Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
86. 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 618. The Court cited Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1953)
and Zwickler v. Koata, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). In Zwickler, involving first amendment
rights, a district court abstention order was reversed in a suit seeking declaratory relief
and an injunction against a pending state prosecution. The Court said that the prayer
for declaratory judgment should be considered irrespective of the prayer for injunctive
relief.
88. 390 U.S. at 619.
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on the ground that it was factually distinguishable from Dombrowski.
The decision in Cameron v. Johnson in no way rests on section
2283, although the prosecution of at least some of the plaintiffs had
commenced before the federal injunction was sought. Mr. Justice
Fortas, in dissent, noted that the majority did not reach the issue of
section 2283 and pointed to City of Greenwood,89 where the Court
stated obliquely that first amendment rights might be protected by
an injunction in circumstances where the state prosecution would deny
such rights.90 In the per curiam opinion vacating Cameron v. John-
son,91 the district court was directed to consider whether section
2283 barred an injunction and whether section 1983, the Civil Rights
Statute,92 created an exception to section 2283. The district court
concluded that section 2283 was a bar.9 3 When Cameron was next
considered, the majority of the Court found it unnecessary to resolve
this question. 4 This set of circumstances casts some doubt on the
continuing efficacy of section 2283 in first amendment cases.
The recent case of Dilworth v. Riner95 bears on the section 1983
question. This case held that section 2283 did not bar a stay of prose-
cutions instituted by Mississippi for breach of peace resulting from an
attempt to obtain rights under the public accommodation sections
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. There, as in Rachel, the statute im-
munized prosecutions. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that section 2283 did not require that an act of Congress creating
an exception to section 2283 specifically refer to section 2283 or to the
subject matter of federal stays. Rather it was sufficient if it clearly
appeared from the federal statute than an exception was indicated.
Moreover, the court reasoned that Douglas v. City of Jeanette would
not avoid the injunction, since it rested on the principles of comity
and there could be exceptions based on genuine and irreparable
damages.96
The federal courts have the clear power to enjoin state court
criminal prosecutions or civil actions in the state courts, although
the dictates of federalism are such that federal courts must be slow
89. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
90. 390 U.S. at 628 n.5.
91. 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
93. Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873, 877-78 (S.D. Miss. 1966), citing Baines
v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
94. 390 U.S. at 613 n.3.
95. 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965).
96. On § 2283 as a rule of comity, see T. Smith & Son v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397
(5th Cir. 1960); MOOns, COMMENTAY ON THE UNITE STATES JUDICIAL CODE,
§ 0.03(49) 407-10 (1949). It is settled that § 2283 does not apply to suits brought by
the United States for injunction. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
220 (1957).
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to use this power. Comity is a court-fashioned rule to this end, and
section 2283 is a reaffirmation of this rule. Neither goes to the distri-
bution of power as between state and federal courts, and both Con-
gress and the courts may fashion exceptions to the rule of comity.
Whether civil rights cases resting on section 1983 are such exceptions
is an open question. Nevertheless, the federal courts are otherwise
subject to the rule of caution springing from principles of comity,
which applies where injunctions are sought to stay state proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts on all levels are under a constitutional duty to make the
American system of justice effective, and constant attention to the
letter and spirit of federalism is necessary. The continuing responsi-
bility resting on the state courts is to make federal rights, as well as
state rights, secure. The plan of federalism is that state courts have
the first opportunity to respond to claims of federal rights in habeas
matters, while the federal courts have a corresponding duty in the
same area once the state courts have had their opportunity. Under
the plan, the federal courts do not trench on the state courts in
performing this function. It is a concurrent responsibility. In the
area of staying state court action through the use of the federal
injunctions, federalism requires a cautious approach on the part of
the federal courts. On the other hand, in the area of removal cases,
Congress has established concurrent jurisdiction in the federal courts
with respect to certain rights and questions, as well as in diversity
cases.
The fourteenth amendment refurbishment process has made the
Constitution more meaningful. The courts, state and federal, must
implement the process through more efficient but orderly procedures.
This is the demand of federalism.

